The current war against Iran reveals and confirms what some had already suspected. On one side are U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf and Israeli urban and military infrastructure. On the other side are thousands of cheap drones and ballistic missiles that Iran can produce and launch in large numbers.
Iran does not rely on conventional air forces, but on a combination of missiles and drones whose production is relatively simple (and inexpensive). The drones carry warheads weighing from tens to around a hundred kilograms and can completely destroy a radar, fuel depot, or part of an airbase. At the same time, U.S. and Israeli defense systems must respond to each such target with an interceptor worth millions of dollars—and with limited stockpiles!
Postol emphasizes that the strategy of attrition is already visible. Radars in the Persian Gulf states are being targeted more frequently, and examples like the burning Bahraini naval complex show how real and serious the wartime strike is, even though Western media often either “skip over” such images or push them to the margins. Every successful strike on a radar reduces the defense’s ability to detect the next wave of drones and missiles. Every interceptor used cannot be replaced quickly.
The parallel with Ukraine here is very clear. Russia systematically used drones in the war to exhaust Ukrainian air defenses, forcing them to spend expensive missiles on relatively cheap targets, and ultimately leaving key infrastructure nearly unprotected (obviously, the West bore the cost, not Kyiv). Postol claims that in the war against Iran, we are witnessing “Ukraine 2.0,” but with an additional dimension because Iran has its own large-scale production and potential support from Russian and Chinese industry.
According to his assessment, the production pace of Iranian drones can reach hundreds per day. This creates pressure that Israel and U.S. bases cannot withstand in the long term. Defense becomes a constant firefight, while the attacker retains the initiative, choosing the time and place of strikes. At the moment when interceptor stocks are depleted and too many radars are destroyed, all that remains is firing guns into the sky. Such scenes have already been recorded at certain U.S. bases.
A New Technological Reality – Commercial Electronics and Satellites Change the Nature of War
Postol clearly describes another key element of this war. The development of commercial electronics and global communication networks has erased the technological advantage that great powers once held. Many elements that decades ago existed exclusively within military frameworks are now found in civilian devices and available on the market.
In this war, Iran combines two sources of technological advantage. On one hand, it receives high-resolution satellite imagery of targets from China and Russia. These images cover Israeli cities, bases in the Persian Gulf states, and numerous other critical locations. On the other hand, drones carry commercial cameras and communication equipment that allows them to transmit video almost in real time.
Postol particularly highlights the Iridium satellite network. This is a constellation of satellites covering the entire planet and capable of transmitting data of sufficiently high quality for an operator in Iran to see a target image at a resolution more than adequate for precise guidance. A drone flying over Tel Aviv or a target in the Persian Gulf sends a video signal via an Iridium terminal. An operator at a control center can observe the target, make fine adjustments, and deliberately guide the drone directly into a radar, ship, or fuel depot.
The power of such a system lies in the fact that a highly developed domestic advanced electronics industry is not required to assemble it. Infrared cameras, quality optical lenses, communication modules, and microcomputers are already available on the civilian market. Postol recalls the experience of improvised explosive devices in Iraq. Local groups combined a simple explosive device with a commercial mobile phone and created a weapon remotely activated to strike expensive military convoys.
The same principle now operates on a higher level. A state with limited resources can buy key components and, in its own workshops, assemble a weapon that functions almost like the sophisticated systems of great powers. A drone with a commercial thermal camera and an Iridium terminal, supported by Russian or Chinese satellite imagery, becomes a precision-guided missile with a range of several thousand kilometers.
In this new technological reality, the West’s traditional advantage rapidly erodes. Investments in expensive platforms and “smart” interceptors face an opponent who combines industrial flexibility, commercial technology, and political determination for a long-term war of attrition.
The Myth of the Missile Shield – The History of a Major Deception
Postol’s work is best known for a systematic critique of missile defense. As early as the 1990s, analyses of the Gulf War showed that the Patriot system practically did not shoot down any Iraqi SCUD missiles, even though politicians and military leaders at the time spoke of “high success rates.” Together with his colleague George Lewis, Postol exposed this construction and demonstrated that the alleged successes were actually interceptor explosions in the air without destroying the enemy warhead.
Today, in the war against Iran, he sees an almost identical situation. The modernized version of the Patriot, the so-called PAC-3, has some technical upgrades, but the fundamental problem remains. An interceptor must hit a small object entering the atmosphere at speeds multiple times faster than the speed of sound, while facing a whole package of countermeasures used by the attacker.
He describes Iranian next-generation ballistic missiles in detail. Their warheads have aerodynamic surfaces allowing maneuvering at altitudes of around twenty kilometers. Rocket engines at the rear increase speed in the final flight phase and reduce deceleration caused by air resistance. Such a warhead can reach speeds of around Mach 10 or more at impact. The kinetic energy of the vehicle then converts into heat and contributes to overall destructive effect. Postol estimates that such warheads can deliver destructive power equivalent to twice the explosive mass they carry.
He also describes the use of decoys, electronic jammers, and “clouds of metallic strips” that radars register as potential targets. Similar decoy systems have been demonstrated by Russia and North Korea in their ballistic tests. Under such conditions, missile defense systems cannot determine which object is the real warhead and which is a decoy. Even if interceptors were perfect, the sensors guiding them lose reliability.
His assessment of the effectiveness of current systems like the Patriot and Israel’s Iron Dome ranges only a few percent against ballistic missiles with serious countermeasures. In addition, interceptor stocks are quickly depleted, and their production is expensive and slow. On the ground, this translates into cities where the sky lights up with explosions, while the media narrative speaks of “high interception rates.”
Missile defense is not just a technical problem. It is also a political project. For years, the public has been promised security and a shield that will protect the population from ballistic missiles. In reality, these are military programs that consume vast resources, fuel an arms race, and simultaneously provide a false sense of security. When missiles and drones truly strike cities, the real picture becomes visible in footage from Tel Aviv, Haifa, and bases in the Persian Gulf.
A War Without Exit – Prolonged Conflict and the Risk of Global Escalation
Postol clearly states in his lecture that he does not see a quick end to the war against Iran. Iran is a large country with about 90 million people and a relatively cohesive society. Internal divisions exist, but they do not offer a scenario of rapid collapse. On the other hand, Israel is a small state exposed to concentrated strikes, and U.S. bases in the region are within range of Iranian missiles and drones.
He himself notes that his contacts in Israel describe daily life as “hellish.” Systematic attacks on Tel Aviv and Haifa, strikes on industrial and military targets, and interruptions in water and energy supply create a sense of prolonged insecurity. Postol concludes that this is not an episode that will end after a few days or weeks, but the beginning of a period in which Israel and U.S. forces will suffer increasingly severe infrastructure losses.
As we mentioned, the darkest part of his assessment concerns the risk that Israeli leadership, in a moment of desperation, may resort to nuclear weapons. He openly expresses doubt that there would be a real capacity in Washington to prevent such a move, even if American politicians claim otherwise. In a scenario in which Israel launches a nuclear strike on Iran, Postol expects that Iran would respond with its own nuclear weapons in a very short time.
Such a sequence of events would not remain isolated in the Middle East. Russia and China already have direct interests in the region and likely already support Iran significantly more than they wish to reveal. Nuclear exchange in the heart of the Middle East would trigger a chain of reactions. Questions would arise about the roles Moscow and Beijing would assume and how Washington would respond…
The conclusion from Postol’s analysis is a serious warning. The war against Iran is not just another episode in the long series of Middle East interventions. This conflict brings together all the elements that security experts have long identified as the most dangerous: a regional nuclear power, a state with rapid nuclear breakout potential, the presence of great powers on opposing sides, the mass use of technologies that negate expensive defense, and a political elite prone to maximalist solutions. The war against Iran is already crossing the boundaries of “just another conflict.” We are already witnessing a turning point that will define the security architecture of the entire century.
